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O
ne can describe Justice Ginsburg as a reluctant dissenter. She 
agrees with Chief Justice Roberts that the Supreme Court pro-
vides clearer guidance and its opinions receive more deference when 
they are unanimous. When deciding whether to write separately, she 
asks, “Is this dissent or concurrence really necessary?” “Really necessary” 
dissents would include not only those that force the majority to improve 
their opinion, or those that could well become a majority opinion af-
ter drafts are exchanged. They involve dissents that have implications 
beyond the case at hand, and even beyond the court audience. A dis-
sent, she said, can be “an appeal . . . to the intelligence of a future day, 
when a later decision may possibly correct the error. . . . ” Beyond the 
canonically famous dissents, Justice Ginsburg pointed to Justice Breyer’s 
dissent in Parents Involved 4 and the dissents in District of Columbia v. 
Heller,5 as those that appeal to posterity. Equally critical, some dissents 
can garner publicity and create pressure for legislative change. As an 
example, Justice Ginsburg identified her dissent in the Lilly Ledbetter 
case,6 which resulted in legislative change in 009. In the final analysis, 
Justice Ginsburg expressed hope that her dissents will be stronger for 
having the wisdom to “choos[e] [her] ground.”7
  Given this philosophy, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Herring v. United 
States,8 on the surface, a garden-variety Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule case, takes on special resonance. In Herring, a police officer, suspi-
cious of the defendant who was seeking to gather something from his im-
pounded truck, requested a warrant check. The officer was told that the 68
computer database in the sheriff’s department of a neighboring county 
showed an active warrant for Herring’s arrest. The report was in fact in 
error; the computer database was at odds with the physical records in 
the same office. The warrant had been recalled some five months before 
and was corrected only minutes after Herring was arrested and a search 
incident to that arrest found an illegal firearm and drugs. That Herring’s 
arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights was uncontested; the only 
issue was whether the evidence the police obtained through the unlawful 
search should have been suppressed.
  The majority in Herring held exclusion was not warranted because the 
police error “was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the 
arrest.”9 Consider the concepts: Not only was “negligent” police conduct 
protected from exclusion, but so too was negligent police conduct that 
was “isolated,” and “attenuated.” Trivializing the misconduct, the Court 
held that it did not implicate the “core concerns” of the Fourth Amend-
ment, as did the earlier exclusionary rule cases which involved flagrant 
police misconduct. When the police behave only negligently, it reasoned, 
deterrence made no sense. Applying a cost-benefit analysis, and conclud-
ing that the costs of exclusion far outweighed its benefits, the Court re-
jected exclusion.
  While the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule has been narrowed 
in a host of prior Supreme Court decisions, to Justice Ginsburg, the 
majority’s opinion went too far. A dissent—and a particularly forceful 
one—was warranted, clearly not in the hopes of improving the major-
ity’s decision or supplanting it. That was unlikely. This was a dissent for 
posterity—a call to future courts to undo what the majority had done. 
First, Justice Ginsburg refocused the inquiry on a “more majestic concep-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and its adjunct, the exclusionary rule,” as 
a constraint on the sovereign, and as essential to protecting the integrity 
of the Court. Indeed, the dissent was buttressed not only by the early 
suppression cases, like Mapp v. Ohio,0 but also the legendary dissents 
of Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead v. United States and Brennan in 
United States v. Calandra.69
  And then Justice Ginsburg, meeting the majority’s decisions on its 
own terms, deconstructed its “cost-benefit” benefit analysis. First, the 
contention that the exclusionary rule addresses only conduct that is 
intentional or reckless, not merely negligent, is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the very premises of tort law that liability for negligence 
creates an incentive to act with greater care. And such a test narrowed 
the exclusionary rule to a virtually unprovable conduct—reckless or 
deliberate misconduct on the part of police, and negligent conduct that 
is not just “isolated” or “attenuated.”
  Second, this narrowing is particularly troubling in modern police forc-
es with computerized databases. Attentive to the future cases which were 
sure to come, and to future technologies, Justice Ginsburg noted that 
“[i]naccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic in-
formation raise grave concerns for individual liberty.”4 Finally, the costs 
here were minimal, not the cost of letting the prisoner go free, as the 
majority touted, echoing Cardozo’s famous critique of the exclusionary 
rule (“The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”) 
Rather, the costs were the costs of compliance, of creating incentives to 
check the database for accuracy, which was no less critical when it was the 
misconduct of bureaucrats who were just not paying attention.
  To be sure, Justice Ginsburg’s critique could well have been even more 
pointed. Fourth Amendment scholar Wayne R. Lafave compared the Her-
ring decision to a “surstömming, which (as any Swede can tell you) is touted 
as a ‘delicacy’ but is actually attended by both a loathsome smell that ‘grows 
progressively stronger’ and a dangerous capacity to ‘explode’ beyond its ex-
isting boundaries.”5 The majority’s position enabled the police to evade the 
exclusionary rule when one officer in good faith relied on another officer’s 
bad faith, hiding behind the bureaucracy rather than holding “the police” 
accountable as an entity. Moreover, this was the first exclusionary rule case, 
as the petitioner argued, where the Court excused police failure, not the 
failure of other actors in the criminal justice system. And, rather than creat-
ing a bright line, it encouraged litigation in the lower federal courts about 
when negligent conduct is “attenuated” or “isolated” and when it is not.70
  But, without name calling—maligning the poor “surstömming”—the 
point was made. It was really, really necessary, underscoring themes that Jus-
tice Ginsburg would then revisit in subsequent Supreme Court terms, as the 
majority narrowed the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule still further.
m
Endnotes
    Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Lecture, The Role of Dissenting Opin-
ions, 95 Minn. L. Rev. ,  (00).
    For example, Justice Ginsburg credits Justice Scalia’s dissent in Unit-
ed States v. Virginia, 58 U.S. 55 (996) with making her opinion for 
the Court better. Id.
    Id. at 4 (quoting charles hughes, the supreme court of the 
united states 68 (96)).
  4  55 U.S. 70 (007).
  5  8 S.Ct. 78 (008).
  6  Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 68 (007).
  7  Id. at 8.
  8  9 S.Ct. 695, 698 (009).
  9  Id.
  0  67 U.S. 64, 65 (96).
    77 U.S. 48, 469-7 (98) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Id., at 477-79, 
48-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
    44 U.S. 8, 57 (974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
    555 U.S. at 54.
  4  Id. at 55.
  5  Wayne R. Lafave, “The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule,” 99 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 757, 759 (009).